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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissal in a civil action. R. 246-47. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(j) (Supp. 2002) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and 
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction"). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The primary issue presented for decision by this Court is: 
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the legislative 
mandates establishing compulsory conditions precedent to 
commencing litigation of malpractice actions against health 
care providers as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 were 
not satisfied by Plaintiffs/Appellants, thereby preventing 
Plaintiffs/Appellants from commencing their action and 
depriving the district court of jurisdiction. 
R. 246, 248 at p. 41. 
The standard of review of this issue is correction of error, without deference to the 
trial court. This Court reviews "the trial court's summary judgment ruling for correctness. 
[The Court] considers] only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly 
concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed." Kessler v. Mortenson, 2000 
UT 95, If 5, 16 P.3d 1225 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Price Dev. Co., L.P. v. Orem 
City, 2000 UT 26, \ 9, 995 P.2d 1237 ("In reviewing a summary judgment, we accord no 
deference to the trial court and review its ruling for correctness."). 
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2. Another issue for decision by the Court is whether Plaintiffs/Appellants 
preserved for appeal claims that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 is "unconstitutionally 
overbroad." See Plaintiffs/Appellants' Brief at pp. 2-3. Plaintiffs/Appellants may not raise 
issues for the first time on appeal, including constitutional issues, and Plaintiffs/Appellants 
have failed to marshal the record to support any such claims. Notwithstanding, the trial 
court did not violate Plaintiffs/Appellants' constitutional rights in correctly following the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) (Supp. 2002). "[Wjhether a statute is 
constitutional is a question of law, which we review for correctness, giving no deference to 
the trial court." Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 25, \ 6, 44 P.3d 734 (citations 
omitted). Further, a statute, including Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12, "is presumed 
constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Id. 
(citing Utah Sch. Bds. Ass n v. State Bd ofEduc, 2001 UT 2,19, 17 P.3d 1125; State v. 
Daniels, 2002 UT 2, If 30, 40 P.3d 611. 
3. Plaintiffs/Appellants are not entitled to seek declaratory relief in challenging 
the constitutional validity of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 because they have not served the 




DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations are determinative 
or important to the resolution of this appeal. The more pertinent provisions are set forth 
below as follows: 
1. Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and 
other courts—Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except 
as limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all 
extraordinary writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction 
as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both 
original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters 
filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an 
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1996). Legislative findings and 
declarations-Purpose of act. 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims 
for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising 
from health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of 
these increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the 
cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased 
insurance premiums and increased claims is increased health care 
cost, both through the health care providers passing the cost of 
premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing 
defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary 
in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged 
from continuing to provide services because of the high cost and 
possible unavailability of malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the 
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health 
care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting 
measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to 
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continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the 
same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of 
insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private 
companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to 
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced 
against health care providers while limiting that time to a 
specific period for which professional liability insurance 
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to 
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation 
and settlement of claims. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (Supp. 2002). Definitions. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing created in Section 58-1-103. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, 
or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care 
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical 
care, treatment, or confinement. 
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any 
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach 
of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which 
should have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care 
provider, under a contract, express or implied. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1996). Statute of limitations-Exceptions-
Application. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be 
brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs. . . . 
4 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1996). Notice of intent to commence action. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated 
unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his 
executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to 
commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of 
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place 
of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of 
misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the 
alleged injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be in letter 
or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney. Service 
shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner 
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the 
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been 
served on the date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the 
time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health 
care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the 
expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the 
malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended 
to 120 days from the date of service of notice. . . . 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002). Division to provide 
panel-Exemption- Procedures-Statute of limitations tolled-Composition of 
panel-Expenses-Division authorized to set license fees. 
(l)(a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical 
liability cases against health care providers as defined in Section 
78-14-3, except dentists. 
(b)(i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation 
consideration of medical liability claims for damages arising 
out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide health care. 
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer 
the process and procedures related to prelitigation hearings and 
the conduct of prelitigation hearings in accordance with 
Sections 78-14-12 through 78-14-16. 
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not 
subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to 
commencing litigation. 
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(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are 
confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process. 
(2)(a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a request for 
prelitigation panel review with the division within 60 days after the service 
a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8. 
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to 
commence action. The request shall be mailed to all health 
care providers named in the notice and request. 
(3)(a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this 
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 
60 days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the 
prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the termination of 
jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection. The 
division shall send any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by 
regular mail. 
(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under 
this section within 180 days after the filing of the request for 
prelitigation panel review, or within any longer period as 
agreed upon in writing by all parties to the review. 
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within 
the time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division 
has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review 
and the claimant is considered to have complied with all 
conditions precedent required under this section prior to the 
commencement of litigation. 
(c)(i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written 
stipulation that no useful purpose would be served by 
convening a prelitigation panel under this section. 
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division 
shall within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself 
of jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating 
respondent, and stating that the claimant has complied with all 
conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation 
regarding the claim. . . . 
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7. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11 (1996). Parties. 
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made 
parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected 
by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights 
of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding 
which involves the validity of a municipal or county ordinance 
or franchise such municipality or county shall be made a party, 
and shall be entitled to be heard, and if a statute or state 
franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid the attorney general 
shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to 
be heard. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal was brought to challenge the Order of Dismissal issued by the district 
court. The defendants in the underlying action, McKay-Dee Hospital Center; Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc.; Ivan D. Wright, M.D.; Harold Vonk, M.D.; and Ronald S. Rankin, M.D. 
(hereinafter "Health Care Appellees") all moved to dismiss Plaintiffs/Appellants' 
(hereinafter "Heir Appellants") claims for failure to comply with the compulsory 
conditions precedent to commencing a malpractice claim mandated by the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act (the "Act") as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (Supp. 2002) et 
Following briefing by the parties and oral argument, the trial court on February 4, 
2001 entered its order granting the Health Care Appellees' motions. R. 245-48.1 The trial 
lA copy of the trial court's order, which includes findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, is included in the Addendum hereto. 
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court, considering the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ruled in favor of Health Care Appellees. R. 245-48. 
The trial court found that although the Heir Appellants had filed the Notice of Intent 
to Commence Litigation with the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
("Division"), it was undisputed that the Heir Appellants had failed to mail the Request for 
Prelitigation Review to all the named health care providers in the action. The court 
therefore found "Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions precedent to commencing 
litigation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, 
because the plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction and is compelled to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint." R. 247. Heir Appellants 
subsequently brought this appeal challenging the Order of Dismissal issued by the district 
court. R. 249-51. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented to this Court for review. 
The material and determinative facts regarding the Heir Appellants' claims are as follows: 
1. Heir Appellants' underlying malpractice claims (relating to the death of 
Norma Mary Harriman on March 3, 1999) are subject to the provisions of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (Supp. 2002) et seq. R. 1-9. 
2. Each of the Health Care Appellees is a "Health care provider" as defined by 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11) (1996). 
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3. Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, a "'Malpractice action against a 
health care provider' means any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, 
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries 
relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (Supp. 2002). 
4. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also sets forth various conditions 
which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). 
5. Heir Appellants were aware of the requirements of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act when on February 14, 2001 they mailed Health Care Appellees a "notice 
of intent to commence action" as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8. R. 258, at p. 13. 
6. Despite the admission of counsel for Heir Appellants that no filing fee was 
paid to the Division, R. 258 at p. 12, the court found that "a question of fact exists regarding 
whether a request for prelitigation panel review was 'filed' with the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing." R. 246. 
7. However, it is undisputed that "neither the plaintiffs nor their counsel 
complied with the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for 
prelitigation hearing 'shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and 
request.5" R. 246. 
8. Affidavit testimony was introduced that the Division had no record of a 
Request for Prelitigation having been filed, and that "Because a Request was not filed with 
the Division and the required filing fee was not submitted to the Division, no action was 
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taken or required to be taken by the Division in this matter, and no prehtigation review was 
approved." R. 49. 
9. Despite having failed to satisfy the conditions precedent to commencing 
litigation specified in Section 78-14-12, Heir Appellants filed an action in the Third 
District Court on June 13, 2001, alleging negligence and wrongful death against the Health 
Care Appellees. R. 1-7. 
10. Health Care Appellants moved to dismiss Heir Appellants' complaint because 
Heir Appellants failed to satisfy all conditions under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). R. 13-15; 112-14; 171-73; 188-95. 
11. Heir Appellants opposed the motions to dismiss, filing various memoranda in 
opposition. R. 22-25; 78-86; 154-66; 196-99; 208-10. 
12. On December 19, 2001, oral argument was heard on the motions to dismiss, 
and the court ruled in favor of the Health Care Appellees. R. 258 at pp.3 8-44. 
13. On February 4, 2002, the Honorable Timothy Hansen entered an Order of 
Dismissal. The trial court made the following findings: 
3. However, the Court finds that it is undisputed that 
neither the plaintiffs nor their counsel complied with the 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the 
request for prehtigation hearing "shall be mailed to all health 
care providers named in the notice and request." In light of the 
plaintiffs' failure to mail the request for prehtigation to any of 
the health care providers, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed 
to comply with the statutory requirements which "are 
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation." 
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4. The Court therefore concludes that the Court has no 
jurisdiction based on the legislative mandates set forth in the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 
et seq. 
5. Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions 
precedent to commencing litigation, the Court concludes that 
plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, because 
the plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction and is compelled to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint. 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the statutory 
conditions precedent to commencing litigation and therefore 
the defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and the 
above-entitled action against the defendants SHALL BE AND 
IS HEREBY DISMISSED. 
R. 245-48, attached to Addendum. 
14. Heir Appellants filed a notice of appeal of the trial court's Order of 
Dismissal on March 4, 2002. R. 249-51. 
15. Although Heir Appellants now seek to challenge the constitutional validity of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12, they have failed to serve the attorney general with a copy of 
the proceeding as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11(1996) in order to obtain the 
declaratory relief sought. See Heir Appellants Brief at pp. 2-3. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that the legislative mandates establishing compulsory 
conditions precedent to commencing litigation of malpractice actions against health care 
providers as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002) were not satisfied by 
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Heir Appellants, thereby preventing them from commencing their action and depriving the 
district court of jurisdiction. In 1985, the Utah State Legislature amended the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (Supp. 2002) et seq., to create the 
prelitigation panel process and specified that this procedure is a compulsory condition 
precedent to commencing litigation of a medical malpractice claim. See Utah Legislative 
Report 1985, S.B 153. Prior to 1985, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act had no 
provision for and did not require the prelitigation review process now codified in Section 
78-14-12. In enacting Section 78-14-12, the legislature clearly specified that compliance 
with the prelitigation requirements is "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). The plain language of the 
legislature clearly expresses the intent that these requirements must be completed prior to 
commencement of a medical malpractice action. 
It is undisputed that Heir Appellants did not mail a copy of their Request for 
Prelitigation Panel Review to all the named health-care providers in this action. This 
undisputed fact is determinative of the issues. Thus, the district court properly found that 
"Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions precedent to commencing litigation, the 
Court concludes that plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, because the 
plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this Court lacks jurisdiction and is 
compelled to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint." R. 246. 
In addition, Heir Appellants are precluded from raising issues for the first time on 
appeal, including constitutional issues, and Heir Appellants have failed to cite that portion 
of the record to support any such claims. The constitutional issues brought in this appeal 
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were either not raised before the trial court or were so inadequately briefed and argued that 
the trial court had no meaningful opportunity to rule upon them. Therefore, any such issues 
have not been preserved for appeal. Notwithstanding, the trial court did not violate any 
constitutional rights by correctly following the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
12(2)(b) (Supp. 2002). 
Further, this Court should refuse to consider any constitutional challenges to the 
Act based upon the Division's alleged actions because they are irrelevant to the court's 
order. The trial court's Order of Dismissal was based upon the undisputed fact that Heir 
Appellants failed to mail a copy of their Request for Prelitigation Panel Review to all 
named health-care providers in the action. The Division's conduct was simply not 
considered in the trial court's dismissal. Moreover, Heir Appellants are not entitled to 
seek declaratory relief in challenging the constitutional validity of Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-12 (Supp. 2002) because they have not served the attorney general with a copy of the 




THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS BASED ON UNDISPUTED FACTS AND THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT. 
The only issue raised by Heir Appellants which relates to arguments properly raised 
before the trial court is the issue of the effect of Heir Appellants' undisputed failure to 
comply "with the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for 
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prelitigation hearing 'shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and 
request.'" R. 246. The trial court's order is consistent with the plain language of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (Supp. 2002) et seq., 
as well as appellate court opinions upholding the Act. 
A, The Trial Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because Heir Appellants 
Failed to Comply with the Compulsory Conditions Precedent of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act. 
Utah appellate courts have consistently held that "[i]f these requirements [of the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act] are not fully met, the action will be dismissed."' Carter 
v. Milford Valley Memorial Hosp., 2000 UT App 21, % 13, 996 P.2d 1076 (citing Malone 
v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1992); Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990); 
Allen v. Intermountain Health Caref Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 30-31 (Utah 1981)). The trial 
court properly found that because the requirements of the Act were not satisfied, the Heir 
Appellants' action must be dismissed: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
the plaintiffs did not satisfy the statutory conditions precedent 
to commencing litigation and therefore the defendants5 
Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and the above-entitled 
action against the defendants SHALL BE AND IS HEREBY 
DISMISSED. 
R. 246-47. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act clearly states that no malpractice litigation 
against a health care provider may be commenced until the plaintiff satisfies conditions 
which "are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). It is clear that the prelitigation panel review process 
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set forth in Section 78-14-12 are operative in the commencement of a medical malpractice 
action and determine when and how an action can be commenced. Heir Appellants were 
obviously aware of the Act's requirements when on February 14, 2001 they mailed Health 
Care Appellees a "notice of intent to commence action" as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-8 (1996). R. 258, at p. 13. However, Heir Appellants failed to comply with the 
other requirements of the Act. 
The issues before this Court are readily resolved in favor of Health Care Appellees 
through the proper statutory interpretation of the applicable statutes. As the Utah Supreme 
Court has held: 
When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look 
first to the plain language of the statute. In so doing, [w]e 
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give 
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning. We will not infer substantive terms into the text that 
are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based 
on the language used, and [we have] no power to rewrite the 
statute to conform to an intention not expressed. 
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, f 12, 24 P.3d 928 (quotation 
marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). Thus, each word is given effect. In 
addition, the statutory scheme is interpreted as a comprehensive whole. 
The primary role of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve. The best indicator of that intent is the 
plain language of the statute. Also, [a] general rule of statutory 
construction is that a statute should be construed as a 
comprehensive whole. 
15 
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm Vz, 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 1996) quotation 
marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). Principles of statutory construction 
and interpretation are well established. 
In matters of statutory construction, "[t]he best evidence of the 
true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an] Act is 
the plain language of the Act." "[Statutory enactments are to be 
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful." Likewise, we are compelled to give the statutory 
language meaning and to assume that "each term in the statute 
was used advisedly . . . unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable." We will avoid an interpretation which 
renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or 
inoperative. 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Hunt, 
906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995); Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm yn, 811 P.2d 664, 
670 (Utah 1991); Jensen v. Intermountain Health Caref Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 
1984); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)). 
An examination of the plain language of the relevant statutes and of the statutory 
scheme construed as a whole demonstrates that the Heir Appellants failed to comply with 
statutory conditions precedent. Therefore, by the plain language of the Act, before a 
medical malpractice action can be commenced, certain prerequisites must be satisfied. 
The statutory scheme in question is not ambiguous. The Act clearly states that no 
malpractice litigation against a health care provider may be commenced until the plaintiff 
satisfies conditions which "are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). The inclusion of this language 
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in the statute indicates the legislature's intention to define how and when a medical 
malpractice action can be commenced. 
Also, each word should be given effect. Condition precedent is defined as follows: 
"A condition precedent is one . . . which is to be performed before some right dependent 
thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed." Black's Law Dictionary, 
(6th Ed. 1991). The use of "condition precedent" should be given its plain meaning. 
In addition, the statute plainly requires the "filing of a request for prelitigation panel 
review under this section." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3) (Supp. 2002). The Act 
specifies requirements for requesting prelitigation panel review: 
(2)(a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a 
request for prelitigation panel review with the division within 
60 days after the service of a statutory notice of intent to 
commence action under Section 78-14-8. 
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to 
commence action. The request shall be mailed to all health 
care providers named in the notice and request. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). As a matter of law, 
compliance with the terms of the Act requires more than mere delivery of a notice of intent 
and request for prelitigation review to the Division. The requirements under Section 78-
14-12 include that "[t]he request shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the 
notice and request." Id. (emphasis added). 
It is also well established that "[t]he form of the verb used in a 
statute, i.e., something 'may,' 'shall' or 'must' be done, is the 
single most important textual consideration determining 
whether a statute is mandatory or directory." 
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"According to its ordinary construction, the term 'may' means 
permissive, and it should receive that interpretation unless such 
a construction would be obviously repugnant to the intention of 
the Legislature or would lead to some other inconvenience or 
absurdity." The term "shall," on the other hand, "is usually 
presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such 
previously in this and other jurisdictions." 
State in Interest ofM.C, 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
"The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that of command." Herr v. Salt Lake County, 
525 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974). As a result the trial court had no discretion to disregard 
this statutory requirement. "This mandatory language leaves no discretion to the court." 
Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, U 76, 5 P.3d 616. 
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B. The Heir Appellants' Failure to Comply with Statutory Conditions Precedent 
Prevented the Commencement of their Medical Malpractice Action. 
It is undisputed that "neither the plaintiffs nor their counsel complied with the 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for prelitigation hearing 
'shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and request.'" R. 246, 258 
at pp. 40-41. This requirement is not merely a procedural nicety, but would have alerted 
the Health Care Appellees to the attempted initiation of prelitigation proceedings and 
would have warned them of the possibility that following the prescribed 180-day period the 
prelitigation requirement might be deemed satisfied. As it was, the Heir Appellants' failure 
to mail a copy of the purported request for prelitigation panel review to any of the Health 
Care Appellees deprived the Health Care Appellees of the opportunity to protect their 
entitlement to timely prelitigation review under the Act. 
Because the Heir Appellants did not comply with the Act's prelitigation 
requirements as to Health Care Appellees, they could not commence their action and their 
complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the trial court. The trial court's 
findings and order are clear: 
3. However, the Court finds that it is undisputed that 
neither the plaintiffs nor their counsel complied with the 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the 
request for prelitigation hearing "shall be mailed to all health 
care providers named in the notice and request." In light of the 
plaintiffs' failure to mail the request for prelitigation to any of 
the health care providers, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed 
to comply with the statutory requirements which "are 
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation." 
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4. The Court therefore concludes that the Court has no 
jurisdiction based on the legislative mandates set forth in the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 
et seq. 
5. Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions 
precedent to commencing litigation, the Court concludes that 
plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, because 
the plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction and is compelled to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint. 
R. 246-47. 
Because Heir Appellants never satisfied the conditions precedent they could not 
commence their medical malpractice litigation. The Kansas Supreme Court, interpreting 
similar statutory language, found clear legislative intent preventing the commencement of 
litigation absent the completion of conditions precedent. In Gessner v. Phillips County 
Commissioners, 11 P.3d 1131 (Kan. 2000), the plaintiffs filed suit against the county for 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident involving an ambulance which belonged to the 
county. Similar to the case at hand, in Gessner the initial "actions were dismissed by the 
trial court for lack of jurisdiction" because of the failure to comply with statutory 
conditions precedents "prior to filing the suits." Id. at 1132. 
Examining the relevant statutory provisions including the specific language "before 
commencing such action" and "no action shall be commenced until," the court held that 
such language "expresses a clear legislative intent to disallow the commencement of any 
actions prior to the filing of the requisite notice." Id. at 1133-34 (emphasis added). The 
court further referred to the statutory notice prerequisite as "a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
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commencing a lawsuit" and as a "condition precedent to the filing of an action." Id, at 
1134. Consequently, the court held: 
It is clear that the legislature intended that failure to provide 
the appropriate notice must be construed to preclude 
claimants from commencing a legal action. The failure to 
file a claim against a municipality, pursuant to [the 
statutory condition precedent], is not cured by the 
application of the savings statute . . . . 
We can reach no other conclusion but that the plaintiffs' 
actions were not commenced until well beyond the applicable 2 
year period of limitations and the trial court correctly entered 
orders of dismissal of all three cases. 
Id, (emphasis added). As was the case in Gessner, the Heir Appellants' failure to timely 
comply with conditions precedent prevented the commencing of litigation. 
Excusing Heir Appellants' disregard of the statutory provisions would defeat the 
very essence of the object sought to be accomplished by the legislature: that certain 
conditions are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). Heir Appellants should not be allowed to 
knowingly disregard the requirements and time frame established by the Act through the 
application of the savings statute. 
C. The Statute of Limitations Was Not Tolled and Ran Prior to Heir Appellants' 
Filing of this Complaint. 
The statutory scheme set forth in the Act focuses on what is the proper statute of 
limitations period. It is uncontested that the applicable statute of limitations governing 
Heir Appellants' medical malpractice claims is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 
(1996). The legislature crafted the Act to include provisions ensuring that the statute of 
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limitations is tolled during the prelitigation process, which is compulsory as a condition 
precedent to commencing litigation. The clear intent is that prior to commencing litigation 
of a medical malpractice claim, the prelitigation process must be properly initiated within 
the original statute of limitations. In the medical malpractice context, a plaintiff cannot toll 
or extend the statute of limitations by simply filing a complaint in district court when the 
conditions precedent to commencing litigation have not been met. 
The only way to toll the statute of limitations is to file a notice of intent pursuant to 
Section 78-14-8 and to properly initiate the prelitigation panel review pursuant to Section 
78-14-12. Because Heir Appellants did not comply with the statutory prerequisites, "the 
running of the statute of limitations was not tolled." Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136 
(Utah 1992); see also Kittredge v. Shaddy, 2001 UT 7, 20 P.3d 285 (holding statute of 
limitations not tolled in medical malpractice action for failure to timely file request for 
prelitigation panel review). 
Heir Appellants' complaint was dismissed because it was filed prematurely. Section 
78-14-12(l)(c) clearly states that the prelitigation panel review proceedings are 
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." To satisfy the 
compulsory conditions precedent, generally a prelitigation panel review takes place and the 
Division issues an opinion by the prelitigation panel. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(a) 
(Supp. 2002). It is undisputed that no such review occurred in this matter. However, two 
alternatives means are provided to satisfy "all conditions precedent required under [Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-12] prior to the commencement of litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-12(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added.) In this case, neither alternative was 
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satisfied at the time Heir Appellants filed their complaint. Again, this statutory plain 
language reinforces the legislative intent that a petitioner must have complied with all 
conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim. 
One alternative to completing a prelitigation panel review is that "the claimant and 
any respondent may agree by written stipulation" to waive the prelitigation requirements. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(c)(i) (Supp. 2002). If such a "stipulation is filed with the 
division, the division shall within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself of 
jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating that the 
claimant has complied with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation 
regarding the claim." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 2002). No such 
stipulation or order exists in this case. 
The second alternative to prelitigation review, which Heir Appellants attempt to 
invoke, is set forth in Section 78-14-12(3)(b). That section of the Act provides: 
(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under 
this section within 180 days after the filing of the request for 
prelitigation panel review, or within any longer period as 
agreed upon in writing by all parties to the review. 
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within 
the time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the 
division has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to 
review and the claimant is considered to have complied with all 
conditions precedent required under this section prior to the 
commencement of litigation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b) (emphasis added). Once again, the legislature used the 
plain language that all conditions precedent required under this section must be complied 
with prior to the commencement of litigation. 
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Heir Appellants erroneously argue that they were entitled under the second 
alternative found in Section 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii) to file their complaint. As can be seen in 
the statutory language, before this alternative can be applied, the prehtigation process must 
have been properly commenced and the division accepted jurisdiction. Only if the 
Division's jurisdiction has been properly invoked and if the prehtigation review process has 
not been completed within the 180-day period, then after that time "the division has no 
further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review and the claimant is considered to have 
complied with all conditions precedent required under this section pnor to the 
commencement of litigation." Id. However, Heir Appellants failed to properly invoke the 
Divisions' jurisdiction because they failed to comply with the requirements of Section 78-
14-12. Even accepting, for the sake of argument only, Heir Appellants' representation that 
on February 14, 2001, they filed a request for prehtigation review, their complaint was 
prematurely filed on June 13, 2001-well before the completion of the 180-day period. 
When Heir Appellants filed their complaint, Heir Appellants could not as a matter of law 
be "considered to have complied with all conditions precedent required under this section 
prior to the commencement of litigation." Consequently, the Heir Appellants' claim was 
properly dismissed. As a matter of law, their complaint was premature because il was filed 
June 13, 2001, well before the expiration of the 180-day period during which jurisdiction 
rests exclusively with the Division. 
The Heir Appellants argument that the district court has "concurrent jurisdiction" 
with the Division simply lacks any support. As previously set forth, a concept of 
concurrent jurisdiction conflicts with the plain meaning of the Act. The statutory scheme 
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recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of the Division during properly initiated prelitigation 
proceedings and provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations before the completion 
of the conditions precedent to commencing litigation. A petitioner who complies with the 
Act and who timely files for and properly initiates the prelitigation panel review will thus 
not be precluded from filing a complaint in district court once the panel issues its opinion 
and a Certificate of Compliance. Heir Appellants ignore the plain language of the statute 
and simply refer to Section 78-3-4 in claiming there is "concurrent jurisdiction." Heir 
Appellants' Brief at p. 8. However, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp. 2002) provides: 
"The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in 
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 5 
provides, in pertinent part, that "The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute." The Act specifically limits the 
jurisdiction of the district court by setting forth conditions precedent to the 
commencement of a malpractice action against a health care provider. 
Further, contrary to Heir Appellants' insinuation, Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 
1990), does not stand for the proposition that the Utah Supreme Court condones or 
approves of the filing of a medical malpractice action prior to the satisfaction of the 
compulsory conditions precedent of the prelitigation process review. In contrast, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: "[W]e do not condone the act of filing a complaint before the time 
specified in the Malpractice Act. The instant case is an exception necessitated by 
procedural errors and omissions." Id. at 23. The circumstances present in that case are 
clearly not present in the case at hand. 
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POINT II. 
HEIR APPELLANTS HAVE WAIVED ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO 
THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT 
ADEQUATELY RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
Heir Appellants are precluded from raising issues for the first time on appeal, 
including constitutional issues, and Heir Appellants have failed to cite to the record to 
support any such claims. "Under ordinary circumstances, appellate courts will not consider 
an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the 
trial court committed plain error." State ex rel E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ^  9, n.3, 21 P.3d 
680 (citing State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, t 8, 9 P.3d 164). The alleged constitutional 
issues presented by Heir Appellants as issues "II" and "III" on pages 1-3 of their Brief were 
not properly raised before the trial court. "[CJlaims not raised before the trial court may 
not be raised on appeal. . . . [This] preservation rule applies to every claim, including 
constitutional questions." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  11, 10 P.3d 346. It has long 
been established that "[i]ssues not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal. This general 
rule applies equally to constitutional issues, with the limited exception of where a person's 
liberty is at stake." Pratt v. City Council of City ofRiverton, 639 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah 
1981). 
Because Heir Appellants did not raise constitutional issues before the district court, 
they are precluded from raising them now. The failure to raise constitutional challenges is 
demonstrated by a review of the record. "For a question to be considered on appeal, the 
record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 
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1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Heir Appellants' have failed to cite pertinent portions of the 
record to satisfy this burden. Heir Appellants simply mention the term "due process" and 
fail to cite any authority or make any substantive argument or meaningful discussion which 
would have enabled the trial court to address any such constitutional claim. R. 204, 258 at 
pp. 27, 29. 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely 
bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing 
the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits . . . . 
[T]he mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at 
trial in support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue at 
trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. 
LeBaron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982)). Heir 
Appellants simply failed to provide any record citation wherein they preserved 
constitutional issues for appeal. 
Similarly, the argument in Heir Appellants' Brief is inadequate to raise 
constitutional issues for appeal. "[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 
(Utah 1988) (citation omitted). 
Although Heir Appellants' Brief cites four cases in its discussion regarding the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002), Heir Appellants do "not 
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analyze these cases to demonstrate that [their] contentions compel reversal of the trial 
court's ruling." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 7, 1 P.3d 1108. 
This court has repeatedly held that appealing parties must 
"'clearly define[ ] ' " the issues presented on appeal "'with 
pertinent authority cited.'" Likewise, Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24 unequivocally requires, that "[Appellant's brief] 
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, including . . . citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
Consequently, "[i]t is well established that a reviewing court 
will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." 
Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ^  20, 48 P.3d 888 
(citations omitted). Because, Heir Appellants' Brief in this case "fails to adequately set 
forth an argument as required by Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure" 
it "may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court." State v. Gamblin, 
2000 UT 44, fflf 7-8, 1 P.3d 1108. 
POINT III. 
HEIR APPELLANTS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
In addition to failing to preserve the issue for appeal, Heir Appellants have failed to 
establish that the Act is unconstitutional. Statutes are presumed constitutional. 
"Furthermore, to the extent we are making a determination of a statute's constitutionality, 
the 'statute is presumed constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality.'" Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 25, ^  6, 44 P.3d 734 (citing 
Utah Sch. Bds. Ass 'n v. State Bd. ofEduc, 2001 UT 2, ^ 9, 17 P.3d 1125; State v. 
Daniels, 2002 UT 2, \ 30, 40 P.3d 611). 
28 
In addition, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act has been previously upheld as 
constitutional. In Allen v Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981), the 
court held the statute, which allows a two-year statute of limitations period for malpractice 
actions, is not unconstitutional. The court found that the legislative determination to have 
the shortened two-year statute of limitation in order to "insure the continued availability of 
adequate health care services" was not arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. at 32. Although the 
statutory conditions precedent impose conditions on a claimant's ability to commence 
litigation against health care providers, like any other reasonable legislative condition they 
do not restrict or preclude a claimant's ability to proceed if those conditions are satisfied. 
Thus, Heir Appellants' representations that the only purpose of the Act is to "expedite early 
evaluation and settlement of claims," Heir Appellants' Brief at p. 17, disregards the plain 
language of the Act and prior rulings of the Utah Supreme Court. The stated purpose of the 
act is as follows: 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and 
claims for damages and the amount of judgments and 
settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in 
recent years. Because of these increases the insurance 
industry has substantially increased the cost of medical 
malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance 
premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, 
both through the health care providers passing the cost of 
premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing 
defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential 
adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers 
are discouraged from continuing to provide services because of 
the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice 
insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of 
alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are 
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producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to 
protect the public interest by enacting measures designed 
to encourage private insurance companies to continue to 
provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the 
same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the 
availability of insurance in the event that it becomes 
unavailable from private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to 
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced 
against health care providers while limiting that time to a 
specific period for which professional liability insurance 
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to 
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation 
and settlement of claims. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1996) (emphasis added). 
Contrary to Heir Appellants' characterization, the Act does not simply "eliminate 
lawsuits against providers of medical care." Heir Appellants' Brief at p. 18. The Act serves 
to further the legislature's legitimate purpose of protecting the public interest. Heir 
Appellants have not been deprived of any constitutional rights. 
POINT IV. 
BECAUSE HEIR APPELLANTS HAVE NOT COMPLIED WITH UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-33-11 (1996) THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DECLARATORY RELIEF 
Heir Appellants are not entitled to seek declaratory relief in challenging the 
constitutional validity of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002) because they have not 
served the attorney general with a copy of the proceeding as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-33-11 (1996). When a statute is alleged to be invalid, as Heir Appellants contend, the 
attorney general must be given a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard: 
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made 
parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected 
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by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights 
of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding 
which involves the validity of a municipal or county ordinance 
or franchise such municipality or county shall be made a party, 
and shall be entitled to be heard, and if a statute or state 
franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid the attorney 
general shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and 
be entitled to be heard. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11 (1996) (emphasis added). Because Heir Appellants are 
challenging the validity of state statutes, before obtaining declaratory relief they should 
have notified the attorney general. 
IX. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, McKay-Dee Hospital respectfully requests 
that the Court affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18TH day of September 2002. 
BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN & WHITE 
pwu^_ 
JoAnn E. Camahar 
Paul D. Van Komen 
Attorneys for Appellees McKay-Dee Hospital Center 
and Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 
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MCKAY DEE HOSPITAL CENTER, 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., 
Utah corporations, DR. IVAN D. WRIGHT, 
DR. HAROLD VONK and DR. RONALD S. 
RANKIN, individuals, and JOHN DOES 1-
50, 
Defendants 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 010905108 
Honorable Timothy Hanson 
The Court on December 19, 2001 heard argument on the defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs were represented by Thor B. Roundy; defendants McKay-
Dee Hospital Center and Intermountain Health Care, Inc. were represented by Paul D. Van 
Komen; Ivan D. Wright, M.D. was represented by Robert G. Wright; and defendants Harold 
Vonk, M.D. and Ronald S. Rankin, M.D. were represented by John David Ference. The Court, 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB - 4 2002 
SALT LAW/COUNTY 
Deputy-Clerk 
having heard oral argument from counsel and having reviewed and considered the memoranda 
and affidavits submitted by the parties, finds as follows: 
1. Because matters outside the pleading were presented and considered by the Court, 
the motions to dismiss were treated as motions for summary judgment under Rule 12(b) and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56. 
2. The Court finds that a question of fact exists regarding whether a request for 
prelitigation panel review was "filed" with the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 
3. However, the Court finds that it is undisputed that neither the plaintiffs nor their 
counsel complied with the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for 
prelitigation hearing "shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and 
request." In light of the plaintiffs' failure to mail the request for prelitigation to any of the health 
care providers, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed to comply with the statutory requirements 
which "are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." 
4. The Court therefore concludes that the Court has no jurisdiction based on the 
legislative mandates set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
1 et seq. 
5. Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions precedent to commencing 
litigation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, because 
the plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this Court lacks jurisdiction and is 
compelled to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiffs 
-2-
did not satisfy the statutory conditions precedent to commencing litigation and therefore the 
defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and the above-entitled action against the 
defendants SHALL BE AND IS HEREBY DISMISSEI 
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Robert G. Wright 
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700 Key Bank Tower. 50 South Main Street 
P O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake Cirv. Utah 84110 
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Richard Campbell 
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